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MINORITY BUY-OUT RIGHTS IN THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 
Lynne Taylor* 
The purpose of this article is to review the buy-out, or appraisal, rights 
available to minority shareholders in the Companies Act 1993. Buy-out 
rights enable shareholders who dissent to specified special resolutions to 
exit a company by requiring it to purchase their shares at a fair and 
reasonable value.' The special resolutions that trigger buy-out rights were 
described by the New Zealand Law Commission as involving 
"fundamental ' changes to the nature of a company or changes to the rights 
attached to the shares held by a z hare holder.^ In fact they are special 
resolutions of a company approving a major transaction, a long form 
amalgamation, an alteration to a company's constitution that imposes or 
removes a restriction on its activities together with a special resolution of 
an interest group that alters the rights attached to the shares of that group. 
This review begins by examining the stated reasons for the introduction 
of buy-out rights in New Zealand and North America in the light of the 
actual role such rights have played in North America. The focus then shifts 
to circumstances in which buy-out rights are triggered, the statutory 
procedure that dissenting shareholders must follow and issues likely to 
arise in the context of an assessment of what is a "fair and reasonable" 
price for the shares of dissenting shareholders. 
Buy-out rights, said the New Zealand Law Commission, are: 
. . . designed to ensure that in the case of fundamental change to the nature of the enterprise 
and to the class rights enjoyed by the shareholder, a dissenting minority shareholder does 
not inevitably have to accept the majority decision. The shareholder will instead have the 
option of leaving the company . . . The buy-out procedure recognises not only that there is 
a level of change to which it is unreasonable to require shareholders to submit but also that 
in many cases the presence of a disgmntled minority shareholder will be of little benefit to 
the company i t ~ e l f . ~  
The official explanation given for the introduction of buy-out rights in 
Canada reflects that given by the New Zealand Law Commission. Buy- 
out rights have been a feature of Ontario's company law since 1953,4 but 
they were not incorporated on a national basis until the adoption of the 
recommendations contained in the Dickerson Report5 in 1975.6 The authors 
of this report explained the function of the new rights as:' 
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. . . if the majority seeks to change fundamentally the nature of the business in which the 
shareholder invested, and if the shareholder dissents from the change, he may demand that 
the corporation pay him the fair value of his shares as determined by an outside appraiser. 
The Dickerson Report, unlike its New Zealand equivalent, dealt briefly 
with the historical background that led to the identified need for buy-out 
rights. It was suggested that the introduction of such rights compensated 
shareholders for a right of veto that they once possessed in respect of 
fundamental corporate changes and for which the common law had been 
unable to develop a satisfactory repla~ement.~ In Great Britain, whose 
company law system New Zealand followed until the enactment of the 
Companies Act 1993, it was true that unanimous shareholder consent was 
required to amend the deed of settlement of a joint stock ~ o m p a n y . ~  
However, any consistent right of veto that minority shareholders possessed 
was removed by the introduction of the first general legislation to regulate 
joint stock companies - the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856." Section 33 
of this Act reserved the right to the company in general meeting by special 
resolution to alter or add to its articles of association. Section 12 of the 
Companies Act 1862," which introduced the modern form of company, 
went further and provided that the company by special resolution could 
modify certain aspects of its memorandum of association.I2 Section 160 
of Companies Act 1862 also provided that a company in voluntary 
liquidation could reconstruct by way of special resolution authorising the 
liquidator to transfer company property to another company in return for 
shares in the transferee company. 
Minority shareholders were not totally ignored by legislation. Section 
161 of the Companies Act 1862 gave a shareholder who dissented to a 
special resolution that the liquidator of a company in voluntary liquidation 
transfer company property in return for shares the right to require the 
liquidator to purchase his or her shares at a price to be determined by 
agreement or arbitration. This, of course, was a very early form of buy-out 
right and one which survived in New Zealand in s 278 of the Companies 
Act 1955. Another early form of buy-out right could be found in s 208(2) 
of the Companies Act 1955 which allowed a shareholder who dissented 
from an offer to purchase the shares of a company, or of a class, of which 
90% of other shareholders had accepted to require the offeror to purchase 
his or her shares on the same terms as previously offered or otherwise as 
agreed or as fixed by the High Court. Further, s 209 of the Companies Act 
1955 conferred upon the High Court a discretion to order various forms of 
relief if it considered it just and equitable to do so once minority 
shareholders had established that a change or proposed change was 
oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or unfairly prejudicial.I3 Minority 
shareholders could also seek an order that a company be wound up on the 
ground that it was just and equitable to do so pursuant to s 217(f) of the 
Companies Act 1 955.14 
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80-88. 
9 Natusch v Irving (1 824) 2 Coop. T. Coop 358; 47 E.R 1 196. 
10 19 & 20 Vict, c. 47 (UK). 
11 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89 (UK'I. 
12 For the modem equival&t see ss 17 and 18 of the Companies Act 1955. 
13 See now s 174 of the Companies Act 1993. 
14 Re Tivoli Freeholds Ltd [I9721 VR 445. The equivalent provision in the Companies Act 1993 is s 
24 1(4)(d). 
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Despite the protection described above, few would argue that the 
combination of a lack of an available market and possible restrictions in a 
company's constitution on the disposal of its shares could operate to limit 
the ability of minority shareholders to exit a closely held company and 
obtain a fair and reasonable mice for their shares.15 This ~ o i n t  is reinforced 
by the attribute of perpetual succession conferred upon a company on 
incorporation, in other words, there is no end in sight for minority 
shareholders caught in a closely held company fundamentally different 
from the one in which they originally invested. Further, even where there 
is an available market for a company's shares it is another issue entirely as 
to whether the market price is a fair and reasonable price.I6 
A considerable amount ofpaper has been consumed in the United States 
of America in an attempt to rationalise the continued existence of buy-out 
rights and the form that such rights should take. The origins of buy-out 
rights in the United States can bc traced to the process of company 
incorporation that developed after the American Revolution. After this 
time the only method of company incorporation was by a grant of a charter 
- initially by a private Act passed by a state legislature and from the early 
nineteenth century onwards by general incorporation statutes.17 A 
company's charter, whether granted by a private Act or general 
incorporation statute, was deemed to form a contract to which the company, 
the state and shareholders were parties. IX In cases of change categorised as 
"fundamental" ordinary contractual principles applied, that is, the charter 
could not be varied without the unanimous consent of all shareholders." 
As the Supreme Court of Ohio in Armstrong v Marathon Oil Co e~plained:~' 
... the stockholder has purchased a portion of a going concern, and his approval was 
necessary to divest him of that which hc had purchased. 
However, as technology advanced with the industrial revolution it 
became feasible and then a reality for large companies to exist. A shift in 
focus then occurred so that it became to be seen as "immoral" for one 
shareholder to be able to veto a course approved by the ~najori ty.~'  
Ultimately the 18th and early 19th century rules22 requiring unanimity in 
the context of charter amendments involving fundamental change were 
relaxed in favour of the more familiar concept of majority or supermajority 
rule - first by the courts and then by a growing number of state legislatures 
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries." 
15 Farrar & Russell, op cit. abovc n 8, at 248, New Zcaland Law Commission, op cit, above n 2, at 
207; C'anadiarz Gus und Enerm Fnnd Ltd v Scqtrc, Resources Ltd [I9851 5 WWR 43, 5 I .  
16 See Part V below. 
17 C.A Cooke, (hrporution Trusl and ('ompuny ( 1950) 93 - 94; B. W King, "The Use of Supermajority 
Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy and Shareholder 
Protection" ( 1996) 2 1 Del. J Corp. L 895, 900. 
18 E.M Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters" (1927) 75 U of Pa 
L. Rev 585, 586; N.D Lattin, "Minor~ty and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental 
Changes" (1958) 23 Law & Contcmp Prob 307.307; E..I Weiss, "The Law of'rakeout Mergers: A 
Historical Perspective" (198 I ) 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev 624,629; M Siegel, "Back to the Future: Appraisal 
Rights in the Twenty-First Centuryv (1 995) 32 Harv. J. Lcgis 79, 86; Armslrong v Marathon Oil 
fi 5 13 N.E.2d 776,781 (1987) (Ohio. SC); Stringer v Cur Data Systems Inc 84 I P.2d 1183, 1 184 
(1 992) (Or SC). 
19 W.J Carney, "Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders & Business Purposes" 
(1 980) Am. B. Found. Kes. J 69, 78; King, op cit, above n 17, at 901. 
20 5 13 N. tI.2d 776,782 (1987). 
2! Carney, op cit, abovc n 19, at 80-82; King, op cit, above n 17, at 909. 
22 This was not a uniform dcvcloprncnt in all arcas. Carney, above n 19, at 79 reports a number of 
instances of the requirement of unanimous consent being enforced by the courts in the early 20th 
century. 
23 Siegel, op eit, abovc n 18, at 86 - 88. 
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Although there is debate amongst commentators as to whether buy-out 
rights were a creation of the judiciary24 or of legislation2' there is consensus 
that their development followed the statutory endorsement of majority 
rule.26 It seems clear, however, that the development of minority buy-out 
rights was not an immediate response to the introduction of majority rule. 
Thompson notes that it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that statutory 
buy-out rights were common.27 Notably the new statutory provisions did 
not extend the circumstances in which minority buy-out rights were 
triggered beyond those situations where unanimous shareholder approval 
had once been required. Further, the events which triggered these new 
statutory buy-out rights varied from state to state with some choosing to 
confer buy-out rights in all circumstances where unanimous shareholder 
consent was previously required and others in only a limited number of 
those  circumstance^.^^ Variations between states were documented in the 
early1 9 6 0 ~ ~ ~  and again in the 1990~.~O In 1994 the American Law Institute 
noted that all states conferred buy-out rights in the case of some forms of 
mergers and  consolidation^.^^ At the same time, 46 states conferred buy- 
out rights when a sale of substantially all of a company's assets occurred 
and 25 in the case of defined amendments to a company's charter.32 
The conventional view in the United States is that buy-out rights 
developed as a compromise between recognition of the principle of majority 
control and the accompanying need to confer some protection on the 
minority.33 The solution, it was thought, was to give the minority a right of 
exit so that they were not forced to remain in a company that was radically 
different from the one in which they had originally invested.34 Other 
commentators have sought to explain the continued existence of buy-out 
rights as being necessary to monitor the conduct of management3' and the 
majority.36 It has also been observed that buy-out rights are of benefit to 
the company as it is able to continue with the planned change - unless 
there are sufficient dissenting shareholders to prevent the change 
occurring.37 This last point also illustrates the monitoring role buy-out 
24 B Mannmg, "The Shareholders' Appraisal Right: An Essay for Frank Coker" (1 962) 72 Yale L.J 
223,246; S~egel, op cit, above n 18, at 89. 
25 M.AEisenberg, The Structure ofthe Corporatron (1976) 75; H Kanda & S Levmore, "The Appraisal 
Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law" (1985) 32 UCLA L. Rev 429,430; L.D Solomon, D.E 
Schwartz, J.D Bauman & E.J Weiss, Corporations Law and Polrcy (3rd edn, 1994) 397. 
26 Kanda & Levmore, op cit, above n 25, at 430; American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate 
Governance. Analysis and Recommendations (1994) 292-293; R.B Thompson "Exit, Liquidity, 
and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law" (1995) 84 Geo L.J 1 at 14. 
27 Ibid. 
28 1.J Levy, "Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment" (1930) 15 Cornell L.Q 
420,421; E.R Latty, "Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the new Corporation Statutes" (1958) 23 
Law & Contemp Prob 363,389-391; Thompson, op cit, above n 26, at 14 - 15. 
29 Manning, op cit, above n 24, at 262-265. 
30 Siegel, op cit, above n 18, at 81. 
3 1 In the United States a consolidation is said to occur when two companies amalgamate to form a 
new company whereas a merger occurs when two companies amalgamate and the newly 
amalgamated company is one of amalgamating companies. 
32 Op cit, above n 26, at 301. 
33 American Law Institute, op cit, above n 26 at 29 1-292; Walter JSchloss Assoc v Chesapeake & 0 
Ry 536 A.2d 147, 152 (1988) (Md Ct Spec App); Steinberg v Amplica Inc 729 P.2d 683, 687 
(1989) (Cal SC). 
34 Levy, op cit, above n 28, at 421; Eisenberg, op cit, above n 25, at 78; Siegel, op cit, above n 18, 
at 94: Thomvson. oo cit. above n 26. at 3. 
35 ~ i s e n b e r ~ ,  Gp cit,'above'n 25, at 8 3 ; ' ~ . ~  Easterbrook, & D.R Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law (199 1) 145-47. 
36 J.L Weiner, "Payment of Dissenting Shareholders" (1927) Colum L. Rev 547; Easterbrook & 
Fischel, op cit, above n 35, at 145-47. 
37 J.D Cox, T.L Hazen & F.H O'Neal, Corporations (1995) 22.24. 
Minority Buy-Out Rights In The Compunies Act 1993 543 
rights may play - the very existence of such rights may well cause company 
management to review carefully the plans for change it presents to 
shareholdet-s.38 
However, when one focuses on the practical role that buy-out rights 
have played in the United States it becomes apparent that they have not 
worked in quite the way envisaged by those attempting to rationalise their 
existence. The initial evidence was that buy-out rights were utilised only 
infreq~ently. '~ The first edition of Folk on the Delaware General 
Corporation Law said that "the right is decreasing in significance, and it 
would not be surprising to see it eliminated a l t~gether ."~~ In 1976 buy-out 
rights were described by Eisenberg as "a remedy of de~peration."~' On a 
more concrete basis Seligman cites evidence of 16,479 mergers involving 
companies incorporated in the United States between 1972 and 1981 but 
only twenty reported state court decisions involving buy-out rights - not 
only in mergers but in all other triggering tran~actions.~"t seems that 
early statutory versions of buy-out rights must take some of the blame for 
this lack of use. There was criticism of the complicated procedures minority 
shareholders had to follow, the costs associated with the exercise of such 
rights, the way in which triggering events were defined and of early legal 
standards for valuation of shares adopted by the courts.43 
In the 1990s a different view has emerged. In 1992 the third edition of 
Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law reported that "the appraisal 
right is alive and Siegel, in 1995, wrote that "[tlhere is a resurgence 
of interest in appraisal rights."45 Further, Thompson in the ten year period 
from 1 984 to 1994 recorded that there were 103 reported appellate decisions 
involving buy-out rights.46 It is fair to note that from the mid 1980s onwards 
a new approach to valuation of shares was adopted by the courts4' and 
many states adopted the improvements to the statutory procedures that 
were included in the 1985 Revised Model Business Corporation 
However, it seems that these changes do not fully explain the increased 
use of buy-out rights. 
Instead the explanation can be found in the role that buy-out rights 
now play in the context of what are variously called "freeze-out," "squeeze- 
out" or "cash-out"  merger^.^" Such mergers take various forms but all 
involve the involuntary elimination of a minority shareholder's holding in 
38 Ibid. 
39 American Law Institute, op cit, abovc n 26, at 302-303; S Seligman, "Reappraising the Appraisal 
Remedy" (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 829,830. 
40 E.L Folk, Deluwvzre General Corporalion Luw (1972) 373. 
41 Op cil, above n 25, at 83. 
42 Op cit, above n 39, at 829. 
43 Manning, op cit, above n 24, a1 233: Eisenberg, op cit, abovc n 25, at 83: Weiss, op cit, above n 
18. at 653: Selieman. OD cit. above n 39, at 52: American Law Institutc, OD cit, above n 26, at 293, 
309-3 l 1 : sicg$, op cit: abovc n 18, at 124. 
44 E.L Folk, R Ward. & E.P Welch , Folk on the Getzerul Corpovation Law (3rd edn, 1992) 262.1 
45 Siegel, op cit, abovc n 18, at 79. 
46 Op cit, abovc n 26, dt 25 
47 Welnherger v UOP Inc 457 A 2d 70 1,7 12-7 13 ( 1983) (Dcl SC) 
48 Amcrican Law Inst~tute, op c ~ t ,  above n 26, at 294, Siegcl, op c ~ t ,  above n 18, at 83 
49 Strznger v Car l)ata S\ 7 Inc 841 P2d 1183, 1184 (1992) (Or SC) 
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a company.50 Shareholders in such mergers feature with far greater 
frequency in the reported cases than do shareholders taking the opportunity 
to voluntarily exit a company undergoing fundamental ~ h a n g e . ~ '  Thompson 
notes that in the 103 reported appellate decisions between 1984 and 1994 
that: 52 
. . . [o]f the eighty identified transactions involved in those cases, more than eighty percent 
involved cash-outs; only six arose in transactions between independent corporations in 
which shareholders had the opportunity to continue. 
Cash-out mergers did not feature in the reported cases on the early 
statutory versions of buy-out rights for one key reason t h e y  were generally 
not permitted.53 It was not until the 1960s that the use of cash as 
consideration in the context of mergers was permitted by statute in most 
states.54 However, it was the Supreme Court of Delaware decision in 
Weinberger v UOP IncSS that gave buy-out rights new prominence. 
Weinberger brought a class action challenging the elimination of UOP 
Inc's minority shareholders by way of a cash-out merger between UOP 
Inc and Signal Companies Inc. Signal held 50.5% of the shares in UOP 
and the merger was approved by it and the majority of the minority 
shareholders in UOP. Weinberger did not seek to seek to exercise appraisal 
or buy-out rights. He instead sought recissionary damages alleging that 
the merger did not meet the business purpose test approved by the Supreme 
Court of Delaware in Singer v Magnvox C ~ , ~ V a n z e r  v International 
General Industries Inc" and Roland International Corp v N ~ J J ~ K ~ '  This 
trio of cases had allowed a cause of action against directors who approved 
a merger that had as its sole purpose the squeezing-out of minority 
shareholders - such mergers having been held to be "an abuse of the 
corporate process."5y The Supreme Court in Weinberger overruled these 
earlier cases holding that the business purpose test did not confer any 
meaningful protection on minority shareholders and was no longer of any 
force.60 The Court indicated that in its opinion the appropriate test for the 
case before it was whether the merger was fair and that although the concept 
of "fairness" had two aspects being fair dealing and fair price, "the issue 
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairne~s."~' 
It was ultimately held that there were reversible errors as to both fair dealing 
and fair price on the given facts and that the appropriate remedy for 
Weinberger was monetary damages. 
50 The most common form of freeze-out transaction ~nvolvcs the amalgamation of one company 
with another that it controls and where the terms of the amalgamation provide that minority 
shareholders in the company controlled by thc othcr amalgamating company receive cash for 
their sharcs rather than sharcs in the newly amalgalnatcd company. Another form of freeze-out is 
a reverse stock split. Hcre a resolution is passed to reduce thc number of shares in the company, 
for example, for evcry 20 shares previously held a shareholdcr will now hold 2 sharcs, and that all 
holders of fractions of sharcs are to receive cash rather than new shares. 
51 M.R Schwenk, "Valuation Prohlcms in the Appraisal Remedy" (1994) 16 Cardozo L. Rev 649. 
52 Up cit, above n 26, at 25-26. 
53 Lattin, op cit, above n 18, at 664-665;Weiss, op cit, above n 18, at 648; Thompson, op cit, above 
n 26, at 21. 
54 lbid 
55 457 A.2d 70 1 (1 983). 
56 380 A.2d 969 (1977). 
57 379 A.2d 1121 (1977). 
58 407 A.2d 1032 (1979). 
59 Schwenk, op cit, abovc n 5 1, at 663 
60 457 A.2d 701 704,715. 
61 At711. 
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Importantly, for the future, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a 
plaintiff's remedy in a cash-out merger, except in circumstances involving 
"fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, 
or gross and palpable overreaching,' should be confined to the appraisal, 
or buy-out, rights conferred by s 262 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law.62 The Delaware approach has been followed in a number of other 
states.63 It has been said that the benefit of the Delaware approach is "that 
it makes more unlikely vexatious law suits by those whose goal is simply 
to receive more money for their shares."64 A further justification is that 
statute has permitted the freeze out of minority shareholders for cash 
consideration and the Delaware ap roach allows corporations to take 
advantage of such statutory devices. gS 
In practical terms the Canadian experience, like that in the United States, 
shows that buy-out rights play a dual role and are also used by shareholders 
who are being involuntarily squeezed out of a company.66 Unlike the United 
States the majority of reported cases do deal with dissenting minority 
62 At714. 
63 Thompson, op cit, above n 26, at 44. See Rabkin v Hunt Chem Corp 498 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Del 
SC); Walter J Schloss Assoc v Chesapeake & 0 Ry 536 A.2d 147 (1988) (Md Ct Spec App); 
Steinberg vAmplica Inc 729 P.2d 683 (1989) (Cal SC); Strrnger v CarData Sys Inc 841 P.2d 11 83 
(1993) (Or SC); Rosenstern v CMCReal Estate Cor 522 N.E.2d 221 (1988) (I11App Ct); Green v 
Santa Fe Indus Inc 514 N.E.2d 105 (1987) (NY Ct App); Walter JSchloss Assoc v Arkwin Indus 
Inc 460 N.E.2d 1090 (1984) (NY Ct App), Stepak v Schey 553 N.E.2d 1072 (1990) (Ohio SC); 
Fleming v International P~zza Supply Corp 676 N.E.2d 1051 (1997) (Ind SC); Pritchard vMead 
455 N.W.2d 263 (1990) (Wis Ct App); Szfferle v Micom Corp 384 N.W.2d 503 (1986) (Minn Ct 
App); In the Matter ofFair Value ofshares of the BankofRipley 399 S.E 2d (1990) (W Va Sup Ct 
App); IRA v Brenner Companies Inc 419 S.E.2d 354 (NC Ct App); Yeager v Paul Semonin Co 
691 S.W.2d 227 (1985) (Ky Ct App); American Network Group Inc v Kostyk 834 S.W.2d 296 
(Tenn CAI. 
64 Stepakv schey 553 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (1990) (Ohio SC). 
65 Green v Santa Fe Indus Inc 514 N.E.2d 105, 111 (1987) (NY Ct App). 
66 A search of Canadian Case Digests on CD-Rom in November 1997 revealed 33 reported cases on 
buy-out rights. In fifteen cases an amalgamation triggered buy-out rights and in eight of the 
amalgamations minority shareholders were frozen out of the amalgamated company: Wall & 
Redekop v W & R Properties Ltd (1975) 50 DLR (3d) 733 (BC SC); Denischuk v Bonn Energy 
Corporation (1983) 29 Sask. R 156; Lough v Canadian NationalResources Ltd (1983) 45 BCLR 
335 (BC SC); Canadian Gas & Energy Fund Ltd v Sceptre Resources Ltd (1985) 29 BLR 178; 
Jakobson v Agassiz Enterprises Ltd (1987) 49 Man. L.R (2d) 270; Neonex International Ltd v 
Kolasa (1978) 84 DLR (3d) 446 (BC SC); Jepson v Canadran Salt Co (1979) 7 BLR 181; Domglas 
Inc v Jarislowsky, Fraser & Co (1982) 138 DLR 521 (Que CA); Investissements Mont-SoleilInc 
v National Drug Ltd (1982) 22 BLR 139 (Que CA); Fraser Inc vAitken (1988) 41 BLR 87 (Ont 
HC); Lo-Cicero v B.A.C.MIndustries Ltd (1988) 49 DLR (4th) 159 (SCC); New Quebec Raglan 
Mines Ltd v Blok-Anderson (1993) 9 BLR (2d) 93; Smeenkv Dexleigh Corporation (1993) 105 
DLR (4th) 193 (Ont CA); Pzck v LSI Logic Corporation of Canada (1995) 131 DLR (4th) 264; 
Lake & Co v Calex Resources Ltd (1996) 139 DLR (4th) 35 (Alta CA). In eight cases sales of 
assets triggered buy-out rights: Bradley Resources Corporation v Kelvln Energy Ltd (1985) 18 
DLR (4th) 468 (Alta SC); Mica Management Centre Inc v Lockett (1986) 37 BLR 209 (Ont HC); 
85956 Holdings Ltd v Fayerman Brothers Ltd (1986) 32 BLR 204 (Sask CA); Kelvrn Energy Ltd 
v Bahan (1987) 52 Alta L.R (2d) 71; Martin v FF Bourgault Industries Arr Seeder Division Ltd 
(1987) 45 DLR (4th) 296 (Sask CA); Lindzon v International Sterlzng Holdings Inc (1989) 45 
BLR 57 (BC SC); Westmin Resources Ltd v Hamllton [I9911 3 WWR 716 (BC SC); Hodge v Pro- 
Long Technology of Canada Inc (1996) 67 CPR (3d) 472 (BC SC). In three cases majority approval 
of a change to the status of the company or the jurisdiction governing the company triggered buy- 
out rights for the minority: Bathhurst Nominees Ltd (NPL) v Pitfield MacKay Ross Ltd (1984) 24 
BLR252 (BC SC); Manitoba (Securrties Commissron) v Versatile Cornat Corporation (1979) 97 
DLR (3d) 45; National Auto RadiatorManufacturing Co v Warner (198 1) 20 CPC 196 (Ont HC). 
Alterations to the rights attaching to shares or restrictions on the issue of shares triggered buy-out 
rights in five cases: Montgomeq) v Shell Canada Ltd (1980) 11 1 DLR (3d) 116; Fitch v Churchill 
Corporation (1990) 66 DLR (4th) 569 (Alta CA); Ultramar Canada Inc v Montreal Pipe Line Ltd 
(1990) 49 BLR 279; Brunt Investments Ltd v Keeprlte Inc (1991) 80 DLR (4th) 161 (Ont CA); 
Xerox Canada Inc v Ontarro Municipal Employees Retrrement Board (1991) 3 BLR (2d) 68. In a 
further two cases the triggering transaction was not disclosed: Roberts v Canadian Canners Ltd 
(1 978) 4 BLR 290 (Ont HC); Skye Resources Ltd v Camskye Holdings Inc (1986) 6 CPC 296 (Ont 
CA). 
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shareholders who appear to be electing to leave a company undergoing 
change. However, the role that buy-out rights play in Canada in relation to 
alternative actions is unclear. A search of Canadian Case Digests in 
November 1997 revealed six times more reported cases dealing with aspects 
of the remedy for prejudiced shareholders than those dealing with buy-out 
rights. This, of course, is only the roughest of guides as not only are the 
circumstances in which shareholders can seek relief pursuant to the 
prejudiced shareholders remedy far wider than those instances of change 
that trigger buy-out rights but an application for relief pursuant to the 
prejudiced shareholders remedy will always involve court proceedings. 
So, when the theoretical reasoning for the introduction ofbuy-out rights 
into New Zealand company legislation is compared with North American 
commentary then there are similarities. However, as detailed above, the 
practical North American experience is that dissenting shareholders do 
not always utilise buy-out rights in accordance with the conventional 
explanation for the introduction or retention of such rights - although 
admittedly this is more the case in the United States than in Canada. It is 
with this aspect of the North American experience in mind together with 
the criticisms that were made of way in which early forms of buy-out 
rights were drafted in the United States that the focus now turns to the 
manner in which buy-out rights for dissenting shareholders are triggered 
in the New Zealand legislation. 
The New Zealand Law Commission described the special resolutions 
triggering buy-out rights as those involving fundamental change to the 
nature of a company and it is to these triggering transactions that attention 
is first directed. As a preliminary point, the ordinary meaning of 
"fundamental," according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is "going to 
the root of the matter, serving as a base or foundation, essential or primary." 
It becomes apparent after one has spent some time speculating on likely 
examples of fundamental change to the nature of a company that this is a 
more dificult issue than first appears and that such an issue can only be 
conclusively resolved on a case by case basis. In the Companies Act 1993 
the issue is resolved by categorising as fundamental those changes to a 
company's structure or business that historically in the United States 
required unanimous shareholder approval. 
Specifically, "fundamental" change is deemed to occur when a 
shareholder casts all the votes attached to shares registered in that 
shareholder's name and having the same beneficial owner against the 
special resolutions specified in s 11 0(a).67 These are: 
the alteration of a company's constitution where the alteration imposes 
or removes a restriction on the activities of the company.68 
the approval of a major t ran~act ion.~~ 
the approval of an amalgamation of the company pursuant to s 221 of 
the 
67 Buy-out rights are also tr~ggered if the special resolution was passed by a resolution in lieu of a 
meeting pursuant to s 122 of the Companies Act I993 and the shareholder did not sign the resolution: 
Companies Act 1993, s 11 0(d). 
68 Companies Act 1993, s 1 lO(a)(i). 
69 Companies Act 1993, s 1 lO(b)(ii). 
70 Companies Act 1993, s 1 lO(b)(ii). 
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It is apparent from the above description that buy-out rights in the 
Companies Act 1993 are only available to shareholders entitled to vote 
and who do in fact vote against the special resolutions specified in s 1 
Whilst one has reduced sympathy for those shareholders who do not vote 
on an issue and then attempt to seek relief in relation to that issue, the 
position that the Companies Act 1993 takes in respect of shareholders 
who have no voting rights is in contrast to that in the Canada Business 
Corporations Act. In the Canadian statute shares that are otherwise non- 
voting are given voting rights in respect of special resolutions that trigger 
buy-out rights.72 Section 189(6), for example, provides that: 
Each share of the corporation carries the right to vote in respect of a sale, lease or exchange 
referred to in subsec (5) whether or not it otherwise carries the right to vote. 
The position in the United States varies from state to state.73 Section 
13.02 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act only extends the 
right to seek appraisal to those shareholders entitled to vote on a triggering 
event.74 In contrast s 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law extends 
buy-out rights in the case of defined mergers and consolidations to both 
voting and non-voting shareholders. The American Law Institute in s 7.2 1 
of its model company legislation published in 1994 refers to appraisal 
rights being able to be exercised by an "eligible holder" - defined as a 
person having a legal or substantial beneficial interest in common or 
preferred shares that either carry voting rights in respect of the election of 
directors or who are entitled to a share of the company's residual earnings.75 
Such a definition is, of course, likely to include voting and non-voting 
shares. 
The limitation of the availability of buy-out rights in instances of 
fundamental change to those shareholders who have voting rights is unusual 
when one considers that the range of other actions set out in Part IX of the 
Companies Act 1993 do not impose such a restriction. It seems clearly 
arguable that holders of non-voting shares are even more deserving of an 
available exit in instances of fundamental change given that they have no 
voice in respect of the proposed changes. Yet, non-voting shareholders in 
New Zealand are currently left with the options of finding a buyer for their 
shares, putting up with the change or seeking to establish the criteria for 
relief under an overlapping action.76 
There does not appear to be any American jurisprudence seeking to 
justify the exclusion of non-voting shares from the exercise of buy-out 
rights. Indeed very few commentators address this issue. Two who do, one 
from the 1930s and one from the present, suggest that the limitation of 
buy-out rights to those shares with voting rights is a historical accident.77 
71 Section 36(l)(a)(iii),(iv) and (v) of the Companies Act 1993 confers the right to vote on a holder 
of a share on resolutions involving the alteration of a company's constitution, the approval of a 
major transaction and the approval of an amalgamation pursuant to s 221. However, s 36(2) states 
that these rights may be negated by a company's constitution. Further, s 37(2)(d) expressly 
authorises the issue of non-voting shares. 
72 See Canada Business Corporations Act, ss 183(3), 188(4). 
73 Siegel, op cit, above n 18, at 130. 
74 American Bar Foundation, Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1985). 
75 American Law Institute, op cit, above n 26, at 310. 
76 Of course if non-voting shareholders are successful in establishing the criteria for relief under s 
174 (the prejudiced shareholders remedy) then one of the orders the High Court has the discretion 
to make is an order that the company or other shareholders buy back the shares of the prejudiced 
shareholders. 
77 Levy, op cit, above n 28, at 427; Siegel, op cit, above n 18, at 130. 
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The explanation given is that non-voting shares were unknown at the time 
that the first statutory buy-out rights were being drafted and, hence, statutes 
which referred to a vote against a defined shareholder resolution as 
triggering buy-out rights, by default, extended such rights to all 
shareholders. There appears to be no good reason why the New Zealand 
statutory provisions adopt this historical anomaly rather than making buy- 
out rights available to all shareholders. 
One possible solution to this difficulty which would not require 
legislative amendment would be an extension of the circumstances in which 
buy-out rights are available in a company's constitution. Commentators in 
both the United States78 and Canada79 have mooted this possibility and it 
is directly incorporated in s 13.02(a)(5) of the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act and s 7.21(e) of the American Law Institute's model 
appraisal rights. Such a course in New Zealand would be possible by virtue 
of s 30(b) of the Companies Act 1993 which provides that a company's 
constitution may include such matters as the company wishes to include 
in its constitution. 
Restrictions on the activities of a company 
The obvious comment that can be made about this triggering transaction 
is that is likely to occur only infrequently. The mainstream commentators 
suggest that only rarely will advantage be taken of s 16(2) of the Companies 
Act 1993 which allows restrictions on the activities of a company to be 
included its company's constitution and the available evidence confirms 
this.80 On a wider note, changes, no matter how great, to a company's 
activities will not trigger buy-out rights in the vast majority of companies 
that have no constitutional restrictions on their activities. 
Section 110(a) provides that buy-out rights are triggered when a 
shareholder votes against the exercise of the power set out in "section 
106(l)(a) of this Act, and the proposed alteration imposes or removes a 
restriction on the activities of the company." Section 106(l)(a) refers to 
the power to adopt a constitution or, if the company has a constitution, the 
power to alter or revoke that constitution. It seems that despite the reference 
to "alteration" in s 110(a) it is also intended that buy-out rights will be 
triggered in situations where a company adopts or revokes a constitution 
and this has the effect of imposing or removing a restriction on a company's 
activities. 
Major Transactions 
A "major transaction" is defined in s 129(2) of the Act as one that 
involves the acquisition or disposition of assets or the acquiring of rights 
or the incurring of liabilities, the value of which is more than half of the 
value of the company's assets before the transaction. "Assets" receives a 
wide definition in s 129(2) as including property of any kind, whether 
78 Siegel, op cit, above n 18, at 120-121 
79 J.G McIntosh, "The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada; A Critical Reappraisal (1986) 24 
Osgoode Hall L.J 201 at 281-282. 
80 CCH New Zealand Ltd, New Zealand Company Law andPractice (1 993) 6-525; Butterworths of 
New Zealand Ltd, Morzson :r Company Law (1997) 10.2. There have been no cases dealing with 
the imposition or removal of a restriction on the activities of a company under the Companies Act 
1993 in the context of buy-out rights or the prejudiced shareholders remedy. Further, there are no 
reported cases dealing with the 1980 amendments to the Companies Act 1955 which introduced 
a similar rule to that in s 16(2) of the Companies Act 1955. 
Minority Buy-Out Rights In The Companies Act 1993 549 
tangible or intangible. Although there are not yet any cases dealing with 
the definition of "major transaction" in s 129(2) one can find examples of 
conduct which would fall within this definition in reported cases involving 
the prejudiced shareholders r e m e d ~ . ~ '  
The statutory definition of this triggering transaction in the United States 
varies from state to state with some adopting "quantitative" tests (such as 
the New Zealand test) and others "qualitative' tests. It appears that the 
general trend is towards qualitative teskx2 The common form of qualitative 
test in the United States can be found in the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act where s 13.02(a)(3) confers buy-out rights in the case of 
a "sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of the property of the 
corporation other than in the usual course of The American 
Law Institute has also proposed a qualitative test in s 7.21(2) of its model 
form of buy-out rights, beingx4 
A sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of substantial assets by the corporation that . . .. 
(2) Leaves the corporation without a significant continuing business, unless the sale (A) is 
in the ordinary course of business, or (B) is for cash or cash equivalents that are to be 
liquidated for cash and used to satisfy corporate obligations, and is pursuant to a plan of 
complete dissolution by which all or substantially all or the nct assets will be distributed to 
shareholders within one year after the date of such transaction. 
A quantitative test has the advantage over a qualitative test in that there 
will less doubt, unlike in a number of reported Canadian decisions, over 
whether a triggering event has occurred.85 The disadvantage of a 
quantitative test is that, as it focuses on form rather than substance, a 
transaction that satisfies the definition of a major transaction may not 
necessarily involve a fundamental change to the nature of the company. 
An example of this would be an investment company that sells a major 
asset but replaces it with an almost identical asset - both the sale and 
purchase fall within the definition of a major transaction but the nature of 
the company remains unchanged. 
Whatever kind of test is adopted it seems that the question of whether 
a "major transaction" has occurred may be subject to manipulation. In the 
case of a quantitative test it is possible to envisage a situation where one 
particular valuation mcthod is employed over another because it has the 
effect of avoiding what would otherwise be a major transaction. In the 
context of both kinds of test a major transaction could be avoided if the 
assets sold or acquired took the form of several transactions rather than 
just one so that each fell below the threshold set for a major t r ansa~ t ion .~~  
Shareholders in these instances have no buy-out rights but may be able to 
seek a remedy under the prejudiced shareholders remedy, or possibly, take 
action against the company's dircctors for breach of duty.87 
81 See Mellon vAl1ianc.r E,xtzle.s Ltd ( 1  987) 3 NZCLC 100,086; ReAshhy B e q h  & Co Ltd (1988) 4 
NZCLC 64,13 1. 
82 American I.aw Institute, op eit, above n 26, at 305. 
83 A similarly phrased triggering transaction can be found in ss 189 and 190 of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act 1985. 
84 Op cit, above n 26, at 300. 
85 Lindzon v Iniernaiionul Sterling lloldings Inc ( 1989) 49 HLR 57 (BC SC); Martin v FP Bouvguult 
1ndustrie.s Air Seeder Divisiorz Ltd (1 987) 45 DLR (4th) 296 (Sask CA). 
86 An example of assets being sold over time which entitled a shareholder to relief pursuant to s 209 
of the Companies Act 1955 can be found in In rcT Feder-uted Fashions (N.Z) Lid (1 98 1) 1 NZCLC 
98,109. 
87 New Zealand Law Commission, op cit, above n 2, at para 205, Companies Act 1993, s 131. 
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Amalgamations 
The final event which triggers buy-out rights under the "fundamental 
change" heading is a special resolution in favour of an amalgamation 
pursuant to s 221 of the Companies Act 1993. Under the Companies Act 
1993 there are two methods by which the amalgamation of one company 
with another can occur. The "short form" of amalgamation described in s 
222 does not require shareholder approval and instead roceeds with the B approval of the board of each amalgamating c ~ m p a n y . ~  The "long form" 
specified in s 22 1 requires shareholder approval following the approval of 
the board of each amalgamating company of an amalgamation proposal. 
Section 220(g) expressly recognises that the terms of an amalgamation 
proposal may provide that the holders of shares in one of the amalgamating 
companies receive consideration for their shares rather than shares in the 
new amalgamated company. A similar triggering event to that found in the 
New Zealand legislation can be found in the Canadian legi~la t ion.~~ 
One of the criticisms of early forms of buy-out rights in the context of 
mergers and consolidations in the United States was that the focus was on 
form rather than substance which made it possible for those in control to 
structure transactions to avoid triggering buy-out rightsg0 More recent 
forms of buy-out rights have sought to deal with this problem by extending 
buy-out rights to other forms of transaction whereby one company in 
substancc merges with another. Section s 13.02(a) of the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, for example, confers buy-out rights not only on 
those shareholders who dissent from certain kinds of merger but also on 
dissenting shareholdcrs in a company planning to exchange its shares for 
cash, property or shares of another company in accordance with a plan of 
share e~change .~ '  
The American Law Institute has also sought to deal with this problem 
and goes further by including as a triggering transaction a "business 
combination" and defining it in s 7.21(a) as: 
A merger, a consolidation, a mandatory share exchange, o r  an exchange o f  its stock for 
substantial assets o r  equity securities . . . o f  another corporation . . ., whether effected directly 
or  by means o f  a subsidiary . . .Y2 
The reference to the business combination being achieved by "means 
of a subsidiary" includes triangular mergers. Such transactions occur when 
a company that has a controlling interest in another seeks to merge the 
company it controls with a wholly owned subsidiary. To retain a wholly 
owned subsidiary the other shareholders in the "target" firm may be 
squeezed out by an offer of cash instead of shares in the newly amalgamated 
company." In New Zealand it would then be possible for the newly 
amalgamated company to merge with its parent by way of a short form 
88 Companies Act 1993, s 222. Section 222 further provides that an amalgamation can only take 
place between a company and one or more other companies that are directly or indirectly wholly 
owned by that company or between two or more companies that are directly or indirectly wholly 
owned by the same company. 
89 See Canada Business Corporations Act, s 190(l)(c). 
90 American Law Institute, op eit, above n 26, at 302-303; Thompson, op cit, above 26, at 17. 
91 Shareholders in the company exchanging its shares for cash, property or shares are required to 
approve such an agreement: s 11.03 Rcvised Model Business Corporation Act. Pursuant to a plan 
of share exchange the company exchanging its shares may end up as a subsidiary of the other 
party Lo the plan. 
92 American Law Institute, op cit, abovc n 26, at 300. 
93 Dissenting shareholders in the target firm would of course trigger buy-out rights pursuant to s 
1 IO(l)(ii) of the Compan~es Act 1903. 
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amalgamation pursuant to s 222 of the Act. Clearly if this sequence of 
events occurred then an amalgamation has taken place to which the 
shareholders of the parent company have not given their approval. Even if 
a short form amalgamation does not eventuate, for all practical purposes, 
an amalgamation in substance may have occurred. A judicial solution to 
problems of this nature in the United States has been the development of 
what is known as the "de facto merger doctrine" by which buy-out rights 
are extended to shareholders in situations where in substance one company 
has merged with another but the transaction is structured so that it avoids 
triggering buy-out rights.94 Such an approach in New Zealand would have 
some historical support. In the case of the limited right of buy-out available 
to dissenting shareholders in a voluntary liquidation in the Companies Act 
1955 it had been held that if a company sought to reconstruct in this fashion 
but instead relied on the statutory provisions permitting amalgamation by 
scheme of arrangement then such a scheme would only be approved if its 
terms extended buy-out rights to dissenting  shareholder^.^' 
In New Zealand buy-out rights are extended to all shareholders who 
are entitled to vote and vote against a special resolution approving an 
amalgamation. However, if from the perspective of the shareholders in 
one of the amalgamating companies, the newly amalgamated company 
carries on the same business under the same management and they make 
up the majority of shareholders in the new company then it is difficult to 
argue that a "fundamental change" has occurred. The Revised Model 
Business Corporations Act96 and the Delaware General Corporation Law97 
seek to deal with this problem by providing that if the number of the 
surviving company's total shares increases by less than 20 percent then no 
special resolution of that company's shareholders is required. Section 
7.2 1 (a) of the American Law Institute's Model takes a slightly different 
approach by not extending buy-out rights in business combinations where 
the shareholders of a company surviving the combination own 60 percent 
or more of the total voting power of that company in approximately the 
same proportions as they did before the combination. However, this is not 
an absolute rule for s 7.21(b) of this model does confer buy-out rights to 
all shareholders in the case of business combinations, charter amendments 
and other transactions which have the effect of involuntarily eliminating a 
shareholder's equity interest in a c ~ r p o r a t i o n . ~ ~  
Alteration to class rights 
The second situation where buy-out rights are triggered in New Zealand 
is when a shareholder casts all the votes attached to shares registered in 
that shareholder's name and having the same beneficial owner against a 
special resolution passed by the interest group to which the shareholder 
belongs that approves the taking of action that affects the rights attached 
to the shares of the group.99 An interest group is defined in s 116(1) as a 
94 Applestein v United Board & Carton Corp 161 A.2d 474 (1960) (New J SC); Hariton v Arco 
Electronics, ltzc 188 A.2d 123 (1963) (Dei SC); Moreb Brothers v Clark361 N.W.2d 763 (1984) 
(Mich Ct App). 
95 See Companies Act 1955, ss 205-207; Re Tea Corporation Ltd [I9041 1 Ch 12. 
96 Revised Model Business Corporation Act, s 11.03(g). 
97 Delaware General Corporation Law, s 251(f).  
98 Op cit, above n 26, at 300. Such a provision can also be found in s 262 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law. 
99 Companies Act 1993, s 118. 
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group of shareholders whose affected rights are identical and whose rights 
are affected by a proposal in the same way. 
Section 117(2) provides that rights that are attached to a share include: 
(a) The rights, privileges, limitations and conditions attached to the share by this Act or the 
constitution including voting rights and rights to distributions: 
(b Pre-emptive rights arising under section 45 of this Act: 
(c) The right to have the procedure set out in this section, and any further procedure required 
by the constitution for the amendment or alteration of rights observed by the company: 
(d) The right that a procedure required by the constitution for the amendment or alteration 
of rights not be amended or altered. 
This triggering transaction reflects the Canadian equivalent in s 190(2) 
of the Canada Business Corporations Act. However, s 13.02(a)(4) of the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act confers buy-out rights in the 
case of amendments to a company's articles of incorporation that 
"materially and adversely" affect rights attaching to a dissenter's shares 
because the amendment alters or abolishes a preferential right, creates, 
alters or abolishes a right of redemption, alters or abolishes a pre-emptive 
right, excludes or limits existing voting rights, or reduces the number of 
shares owned by the shareholder to a fraction if the fractional share is to 
be acquired for cash.loO The New Zealand provision, in contrast, extends 
buy-out rights in the case of all changes, no matter how minimal in effect, 
to the rights attached to the shares of an interest group. 
The exemption 
It is apparent from the broad terms in which the triggering events in the 
New Zealand legislation are defined that there is unlikely to be any question 
as to whether a triggering event has in fact occurred. Dissenting 
shareholders in New Zealand will not have to grapple with issues such as 
whether a sale of company assets is in the ordinary course of business or 
whether an alteration to the rights attached to shares amounts to a material 
and adverse change. However, the very breadth with which the triggering 
transactions dealing with fundamental change are defined may mean that 
buy-out rights become available in circumstances where in practical terms 
there has been no fundamental change. This does not accord with the given 
reasons for the introduction of buy-out rights which make no mention of a 
wider need to enhance the ability of the minority to quit their investment. 
Further, if the remedy is freely available in such circumstances then the 
consequent need to make financial provision for the exit of the dissenting 
minority could impinge significantly on the power of the majority to select 
the future direction of company. Although not noting this particular point, 
the New Zealand Law Commission did recognise the wider issue that there 
may be circumstances where minority shareholders are legally entitled to 
exercise buy-out rights but to allow them to do so would be unfair to the 
majority.'O1 
The Companies Act 1993 seeks to maintain the balance between 
majority and minority interests by conferring discretion on the High Court 
to grant a company an exem tion from the obligation to purchase the shares 
of dissenting shareholders.g2 A company seeking an exemption must file 
100 The American Law Institute, see above n 26, at 300-301, in s 7.21(d) of its model also refers to 
alterations to charter documents that "materially and adversely" affect defined rights attaching to 
shares. 
101 Op cit, above n 2, at 207. 
102 Companies Act 1993, s 114. 
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an application within 20 working days of the company receiving notice 
from dissenting shareholders that they wish the company to purchase their 
shares.lo3 This is not the only option open to a company as the board can 
seek to rescind the resolution that triggered the rights or to arrange for 
some other person to purchase the shares of the dissenting shareholders.lo4 
It is also possible that the circumstances surrounding the exercise of buy- 
out rights could be taken into account when assessing the price to be paid 
for the shares of dissenting shareholders.lo5 
To gain an exemption a company must establish one of three grounds. 
First, that the purchase would be disproportionately damaging to the 
company.lo6 Second, that the company cannot reasonably be required to 
finance the purchase,lo7 or third, that it would not be just and equitable to 
require the company to purchase the shares.lo8 All three exemptions appear 
to require the same balancing of interests approach undertaken in the context 
of ss 174 and 241(4)(d) of the Companies Act 19931°9 but, as Jones has 
suggested, the breadth of the last ground "effectively makes the other 
exceptions redundant."l1° 
If the company is successful in establishing one of the above grounds 
then the High Court is given the discretion not only to make an order 
exempting the company from the obligation to purchase but any other 
order it thinks fit but including those set out in s 1 14(2).11' However, the 
Court is directed by s 114(3) not to make any order on the basis that the 
purchase would be disproportionately damaging to the company, or that 
the company cannot be reasonably be required to h n d  the purchase, unless 
it is first satisfied that the company has made reasonable efforts to arrange 
for another person to purchase the shares of dissenting shareholders. 
Section 11 5 allows a company to apply for an exemption if the board I 
has resolved that to purchase the shares would result in the company failing 
, 
to satisfy the solvency test and that reasonable efforts have been made but 
have failed to find another person to purchase the shares. 
The exemption relating to company solvency also features in s 190(26) 
of the Canada Business Corporations Act but the grounds for exemption 
in s 114 are unique to New Zealand. The grounds in s 114 will clearly 
address the situation where buy-out rights are triggered but in real terms 
fundamental change has not occurred. Although it seems that the restrictive 
way in which triggering events are often defined in North America will 
achieve a similar result, the grounds for exemption in s 114 clearly go 
further and cover the situation where fundamental change has occurred, or 
rights attached to shares have been altered, but it is not just and equitable 
that minority shareholders be allowed to exercise their legal right to a 
103 Companies Act 1993, s 112(2)(c). 
104 Companies Act 1993, s 1 ll(2). 
105 See Part V below. 
106 Companies Act 1993, s 114(l)(a). 
107 Companies Act 1993, s 114(l)(b). 
108 Companies Act 1993, s 114(l)(c). 
109 Thomas v H WThomas Ltd [I9841 1 NZLR 686 (C.A). See also ss 209 and 217(f) ofthe Companies 
Act 1955. 
110 D . 0  Jones, Company Law in New Zealand: A Guide to the Companies Act 1993 (1993) 80. 
11 1 That is, an order: 
"(a) Setting aside a resolution of shareholders: 
(b) Directing the company to take, or refrain from taking, any action specified in the order: 
(c) Requiring the company to pay compensation to the shareholders affected: 
(d) That the company be put into liquidation." 
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buy-out.lI2 What is also different in New Zealand is that the onus is on the 
company to show that a shareholder should be prevented from exercising 
buy-out rights rather than being on the shareholder to show that buy-out 
rights have been triggered. 
IV. PROCEDURE 
It is the case, that no matter how widely defined the circumstances are 
in which buy-out rights are triggered, the statutory procedure a dissenting 
shareholder must follow and the costs associated with this must have a 
bearing on whether a decision is made to exercise such rights. As has been 
noted the statutory procedure in North American has been the subject of 
cri t i~ism."~ Laycraft J, in Jepson v Canadian Salt Co Ltd, said of the 
Canadian procedure that it: 
. . . prescribes a remarkably rigid procedure which, moreover, seems to be slanted in favour 
of the amalgamated corporation and against a dissenting shareholder. . . . I am left to wonder 
at the legislative policy which produced this procedural morass."" 
In the United States the American Law Institute in 1994 said that: 
. . . the procedures surrounding the exercise of the remedy have long been viewed as so 
cumbersome and time-consuming as to deter all but the largest and most determined 
shareholders."' 
The question is, of course, whether the procedure specified in ss 11 1 - 
1 13 of the Companies Act 1993 fares better in a critical analysis. 
Notice Requiring Purchase 
The first step that a dissenting shareholder must take is to give written 
notice to the company requiring it to purchase his or her shares.l16 The 
written notice must be given within 10 working days after the passing of 
the resolution at a meeting of  shareholder^."^ The point that can be made 
in respect of the New Zealand provision is that the time frame in which a 
dissenting shareholder must give notice to the company is short and there 
is no discretion to extend this time. This raises the issue of whether 
dissenting shareholders will be aware that buy-out rights are available to 
them. In the case of amalgamations, s 221(3)(e) of the Companies Act 
1993 provides that a statement setting out the rights of shareholders under 
s 110 must be sent to shareholders along with an amalgamation proposal. 
There is no such requirement in the case of the other triggering transactions. 
Clause 2 of the First Schedule to the Act does provide that written notice 
of the time and place of a meeting of shareholders must be sent to every 
shareholder entitled to receive notice of the meeting and that the notice 
must state the business to be transacted at the meeting in sufficient detail 
to enable a shareholder to form a reasoned judgment in relation to it. 
112 But see China Products ofNorth America Inc v Manewales 850 P.2d 565 (1993) (Wash Ct App) 
where buy-out rights were denied in the case of an amalgamation camed out in order to subject a 
company to Delaware's company law jurisdiction because it was said that this was not the kind of 
transaction for which the legislation intended to provide buy-out rights. 
113 See the above discussion on the practical significance of buy-out rights in the United States of 
America. 
114 (1979) 99 DLR (3d) 513 at 520 (Alta SC) 
115 Op cit, above n 26, at 293-294. 
116 Companies Act 1993, s 11 I(]). 
117 Companies Act 1993, s I1 l(l)(a). In the case of a resolution in lieu of a meeting, notice must be 
given within 10 days after notice of the passing of the shareholder is given to the shareholder: s 
Ill(l)(b). 
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However, this appears to relate only to a shareholder's decision to vote for 
or against a resolution and not to encompass the options a shareholder has 
after he or she has voted. In North America, in contrast, it is common for 
legislation to provide that shareholders must also be given written notice 
of the availability of buy-out rights in the case of all triggering 
transactions118 and a provision of this kind would have been a worthy 
inclusion in the New Zealand legislation. 
Duties of the company on receipt of a notice requiring purchase. 
Section 1 1  l(2) of the Act provides that within 20 working days of 
receiving a notice from a shareholder who requires the company to purchase 
his or her shares, the board must elect to do one of four things and then 
give written notice of its decision to the shareholder. The board can arrange 
for the purchase of the shares by the company, arrange for some other 
person to purchase the shares, apply to the High Court for orders exempting 
it from purchasing the shares or arrange the rescinding of the shareholder's 
resolution that triggered the operation of buy-out rights before any action 
has been taken in respect of that re~olut ion.~ '~ 
If the board gives written notice to a shareholder that it will purchase 
the shares in question then it must also at the same time, or within five 
working days of giving the notice, nominate a fair and reasonable price 
for the shares and give notice of this to the shareholder.120 This same 
procedure applies if the board elects to arrange for some other person to 
purchase the shares.I2l From a shareholder perspective it would have been 
useful had the New Zealand legislation adopted the rule in Canada that a 
company is required to ive notice of the basis on which it has calculated 9 the value of the shares.' Although shareholders generally have the right 
pursuant to s 178 of the Companies Act 1993 to request information held 
by a company it is unlikely that this information would be received in 
sufficient time for it to be taken into account in the decision to accept or 
object to the offered price. A requirement to disclose the basis on which it 
fixed the price of shares would not place hardship on the board - if a 
shareholder objects the board will be in the position of justifying the price 
it offered in any case. Further, the position in s 112(1) is contrary to other 
situations in the Act where the board is required to give reasons for the 
decisions it reaches.123 
Purchase or arbitration 
If a company has received no objection from the shareholder within 10 
working days after the company has served notice on the shareholder 
nominating a fair and reasonable price for the shares then the company 
must purchase the shares at a date on which the company and shareholder 
agree, or if there is no agreement, as soon as pra~ticab1e.l~~ Jones has 
11 8 See Canada Business Corporations Act, s 190(5) and Delaware General Corporation Law, s 262(d). 
119 Companies Act 1993, s112(a) - (d). 
120 Companies Act 1993, s 112(1). Although s 112(l) does not provide for written notice s 391 of the 
companies Act 1993 does. 
121 Companies Act 1993, s 11 3(1). 
122 Canada Business Corporations Act, s 190(12)(a) provides that the company send to each dissenting 
shareholder "a written offer for his shares and an amount considered by the directors of the 
corporation to be the fair value thereof, accompanied by a statement of how the fair value was 
determined." 
123 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 47(2)(c), 49(2)(d) and 52(2). 
124 Companies Act 1993, s 112(3). 
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suggested that a reasonable interpretation of "as soon as practicable" is 
within 15 working days.'25 This is calculated on the basis that if the 
shareholder does object to the price nominated by the board (and the 
shareholder has 10 working days to do so) then the company is obliged by 
s 112(4)(a) to pay the amount nominated by the board as the fair and 
reasonable value of the shares to the shareholders within 5 working days 
after receiving the notice of objection from the shareholder. Such a 
suggestion does seem appropriate given that it is difficult to see why a 
different time period, particularly a longer one, should apply if the 
shareholder makes no objection to the offered price.126 From a company 
perspective, however, it must be noted that this is only a short time to raise 
whatever funds might be required to carry out the share purchase. On this 
point Forsyth J, in Canadian Gas and Energy Fund Ltd v Sceptre Resources 
Ltd, 12' held that dissenting shareholders are entitled to be paid the price 
for their shares in cash which, unless the dissenting shareholders consent 
otherwise, also seems to be a sensible rule. 
If a shareholder does object to the price nominated by the company 
then the shareholder must give notice f 0 r t h ~ i t h . l ~ ~  Although no time period 
is specified, as was noted above, the obligation is on the company to 
purchase the shares if no objection is received within 10 working days 
after receipt of the board's assessment of the value of the shares. Thus, it 
seems that for "forthwith" one can read "10 working days." If the 
shareholder does object to the price nominated by the board then the board 
must refer the question of what is a fair and reasonable value to arbitration 
and within 5 working days after the receipt of the shareholder's objection 
pay to the shareholder a provisional price for the shares equal to the price 
nominated by the board pursuant to s l12(l).129 
The provision in the New Zealand legislation for reference of a dispute 
about share valuation to arbitration differs from the position in Canada 
and the United States where disputes about share valuation are resolved 
by a ~ 0 u r t . l ~ ~  
The evidence from the United States suggests that the costs of litigation 
to resolve disputes over share price have been off-putting to shareholders 
with small shareholdings. 
... in the few decisions that have described the size of the plaintiff's holdings in the 
corporation, the plaintiff's investment has only rarely been below $100,000, and thus the 
remedy's contemporary utility for smaller investors seems doubtful.13' 
The costs associated with arbitration are unlikely to be any less than 
those of litigation. The issue then becomes what particular features might 
work to ensure that minority shareholders do not feel the need to test the 
price offered to them by the company for their shares. It is suggested that 
providing shareholders with information about how the company has 
calculated the offered share price would be one such factor. 
125 Jones, op cit, above n 11 1, at 70. 
126 Ibid. 
127 [I9851 5 WWR 43,53. 
128 Companies Act 1993, s 112(2). 
129 Companies Act 1993,s 11214)ia). (b). 
130 See, -for example, Canada'~bsine~s4 Corporations Act, s 190(15), (16) and Delaware General 
Corporation Law, s 262. In New Zealand recourse to the court system is not totally lost as c l5  of 
the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996 reserves the right for all parties to an arbitration 
to appeal questions of law arising out of an arbitrator's award to the High Court. 
131 American Law Institute, op cit, above n 26, at 295. 
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Section 112(7) operates once the arbitrator has made his or her award 
and provides that if the price determined exceeds the provisional price 
nominated by the company then the company must forthwith pay the 
balance to the shareholder, and correspondingly, if the price determined is 
less that the price nominated by the company then the company may recover 
the excess fiom the shareholder. Section 112(8) confers upon the arbitrator 
the power to award interest to be paid by or to the shareholders whose 
shares are to be purchased on the excess or balance payable and in doing 
so the arbitrator is to have regard to whether the provisional price paid by 
the company or reference to arbitration is reasonable. The alternative to 
leaving matters to the discretion of the arbitrator would be to include a 
similar provision to the following: 
. . . if the amount so paid is materially less than the amount ultimately determined by the 
court to constitute fair value, the corporation should be required to pay all costs and expenses 
of the appraisal proceeding, including such dissenting holder's reasonable attorney's and 
experts fees. In all other circumstances, the costs and expenses of the action shall be assessed 
or apportioned as the court deems equitable, except that the corporation's attorney's fees 
may be assessed or apportioned against a shareholder only when the court finds that the 
shareholder's action to have been arbitrary, vexatious or not in good faith.'32 
Such a provision would sheet home to the company the risk it faces if 
it nominates a low purchase price for shares to take advantage of the fact 
that the costs associated with arbitration are likely to prevent all but those 
with large and/or valuable shareholdings andlor available resources from 
disputing its assessment. 
One further factor which may go to reduce the number of objections to 
the price offered by the company for shares is the development of consistent 
guidelines for the assessment of share price and this is dealt with in Part V 
below. 
Shareholder status 
The Companies Act 1993 makes no provision about the status of 
dissenting shareholders once they have given notice to the company that 
they wish their shares to be purchased at a "fair and reasonable" price. 
This is in contrast to s 190(11) of the Canada Business Corporations Act 
which provides that once a shareholder gives notice that he or she wishes 
to exercise buy-out rights that the "dissenting shareholder ceases to have 
any rights as a shareholder other than the right to be paid the fair value of 
his shares as determined under this section. 
In New Zealand it seems that a dissenting shareholder will be subject 
to the obligations and be able to exercise the rights set out in the Companies 
Act 1993 and the company's constitution so long as he or she remains on 
the company's share register.134 If, however, a dissenting shareholder also 
attempts to seek relief pursuant to ss 174 or 226 of the Act then the 
commencement of the buy-out procedure is certain to be taken into account 
by the court in exercising its discretion to grant relief under such ~ect i0ns . l~~ 
132 American Law Institute, op cit, above n 26, at 336. 
133 Jones, op cit, above n 11 1, at 79. 
134 Companies Act 1993, s 96. 
135 See Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [I9841 1 NZLR 686 (CA), Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd [I9901 
BCLC 342 (CA) and Shadgett v Appellor Fisheries Ltd (1992) 6 NZCLC 68,166 where the 
availability of an alternative course of action in a company's articles of association was taken into 
account in the context of the prejudiced shareholders remedy. 
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Standard share valuation practice first fixes the value of the company 
and then allocates this value to shareholdings within the company.136 In 
respect of the first step two related issues arise. First, the method or methods 
of valuation to be used, and second, the time at which the valuation is to 
be conducted. Relevant to the second step is the question of whether a 
minority discount ought to be imposed. 
The price that the Companies Act 1993 specifies that shareholders who 
elect to use the appraisal remed are entitled to receive for their shares is Y a "fair and reasonable price."13 It does not seem that two measures are 
intended by the use of both "fair" and "reasonable" in relation to share 
value. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "fair" as "just, unbiased, 
equitable" whilst "reasonable" is defined, inter alia, as "fair." Hence, it is 
suggested that if the value of shares is fair then it will also be reasonable 
and vice versa. It is, therefore, likely that principles developed in relation 
to the prejudiced shareholders remedy may be ofuse for it is a long standing 
rule in respect of that remedy that if an order is made that a shareholder's 
shares be purchased by the company or another then a "fair price" is to be 
paid for the shares.138 
Methods of Company Valuation 
It is the case in both the United States and Canada that when it comes 
to selecting an appropriate method of valuing a particular company139 that 
there is only one rule, and that is, that there is no standard test to be applied. 
Thus, in In the Matter of Shell Oil Co,140 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
said: 
. . . the parties to an appraisal action must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence 
of fair value consisting of "any techniques or methods which are generally acceptable in 
the financial community and otherwise acceptable in court." 
A direction to the use of such methods is now encapsulated in the model 
appraisal remedy produced by the American Law Institute.14' This flexible 
approach replaces the more restricted "Delaware   lock" method where a 
weighted average of four valuation methods was used.142 
136 V Krishna, "Determining the "Fair Value of Corporate Shares" (1987-88) 32 C.B.L.J 132,135; S 
Sirianos, "Problems of Share Valuation under section 260 of the Corporations Law" (1995) 13 
C&SLJ 88, 89; Brunt Ittvestments Ltd v Keeprite Inc (1991) 80 DLR (4th) 161, 194 (Ont CA); 
RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd (No 2) (1991) 80 DLR 134 at 169 (BC SC). 
137 Section 190(3) of the Canada Business Corporation Act provides that dissenting shareholders are 
to receive the "fair value" of their shares whilst in the United States dissenting shareholders 
variously receive the "value." "fair value," "fair cash value" or "fair market value" of their shares: 
Cox, Hazen & O'Neal, above note 37, at 22.26. 
138 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Sociew Ltd v Meyer [I9591 AC 324, 369 (H.L); Struthers v 
O ~ ~ e n h e i m e r  NZ Ltd 119941 MCLR 156. 183: Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd (1996) 7 , , 
NZCLC 260,976,261,607. ' 
139 Accepted methods of valuation include capitalisation of a company's future earings, discounted 
cash flow, net asset value and capitalisation of a company's expected dividends. 
140 607A.2d 1123, 1129 (1992) citing Weinberger v UOP Inc 457 A.2d 701,713 (1983) (Del SC). 
141 ". . . fair value should be determined by using the customary valuation concepts and techniques 
generally employed in the relevant securities and financial markets for similar businesses in the 
context of the transaction giving rise to the appraisal:" American Law Institute, above n 26, at 
315. 
142 For an example of the Delaware Block method in operation see In re Valuation of Common Stock 
oflibby, McNeill & Libby 406 A.2d 54 (1979) (Me SC). 
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The Canadian courts have also adopted a flexible approach when it 
comes to selecting methods of company valuation in the context of buy- 
out rights. Thus, in Re Cyprus Anvil Mining Corporation, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal said:'43 
. . . the problem of finding fair value of stock is a special problem in every particular instance. 
It defies being reduced to a set of rules for selecting a method of valuation, or to a formula 
or equation which will produce an answer with the illusion of mathematical certainty. 
Each case must be examined on its own facts, and each presents its own difficulties. Factors 
which may be critically important in one case may be meaningless in another. Calculations 
which may be accurate guides for one stock may be entirely flawed when applied to another 
stock. 
In New Zealand like views have also been expressed in other contexts 
and it is difficult to imagine why such an approach would not apply in the 
case of buy-out rights.'44 
Time of Company Valuation 
When it comes to considering the time at which a company valuation 
should take place there are a number of options. The valuation could take 
place before the occurrence of the event which triggers the availability of 
buy-out rights, at the time that the dissenting shareholder elects to exercise 
buy-out rights, at the time the fundamental change is implemented or, if 
the matter of price goes to arbitration for resolution, then at the date of 
hearing. The Companies Act 1993 contains no guidance as to the 
appropriate time. Section 190(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 
in contrast, provides that the fair value of shares is to be "determined as of 
the close of business on the day before the resolution was adopted or the 
order made." The aim of such a provision is to exclude from consideration 
any fluctuations in the value of the company brought about by the proposed 
change.'45 However, it has been noted that unless the proposed change is 
surrounded by "an impenetrable wall of corporate secrecy7 then the market 
price of the business of the company may well reflect the proposed change 
before it is approved by the majority.'46 This is more likely to be so in the 
case of widely held or listed companies. If the market does not view the 
change with favour then a strict application of the Canadian statutory rule 
would disadvantage dissenting shareh01ders.I~~ Of course, the reverse 
would also be true. Thus, the conventional view is that: 
. . . the fair value of . . . shares must reflect that value to shareholders of the company in 
which they had invested before the introduction of a reorganisation which changed somewhat 
the nature of their inve~tment . '~~  
More recently it has been recognised by McKinley J, in the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, that such a rule cannot be abso'lute given that some 
shareholders exercising buy-out rights will not be leaving the company of 
their own volition and in such circumstances it may well be unfair that the 
dissenting minority are not able to share in the benefits resulting from the 
proposed change: 
143 (1986) 33 DLR (4d) 642,652. 
144 See Hatrick v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [I9631 NZLR 641,661 (CA). 
145 Smeenk v Dexleigh Corporation (1990) 74 0.R (2d) 385,401. 
146 Sirianos, op cit, above n 137, at 100. 
147 B.L Welling, Corporate Law in Canada (2nd edn, 1991) 581. 
148 Canadian Gas and Energy Fund Ltd v Sceptre Resources Ltd [I9851 5 WWR 43,57-58. 
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In appropriate cases, particularly wiiere thc dissenters have been forced out, the trial judge 
may exercise his discretion so as to allow the dissenters to participate in the benefits of the 
transaction. The availability and nature of participation would necessarily depend on the 
facts of the particular case. 14' 
The particular fact situation before McKinley J did not involve a squeeze 
out and he accordingly applied the conventional rule: 
In this case I have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned trial judgc that the dissenting 
shareholders were attempting to have their cakc and eat it too. Although clearly free to 
participate in the transaction, they declined to so, all the while claiming entitlement to reap 
the potential financial benefits of participation: they hoped to reap the benefits of the 
proposed transaction without accepting any of its risks. I agree with the learned trial judge 
that this is not an appropriate case in which to include in the determination of fair value an 
amount attributable to the transaction involved."" 
The current position in the United States reflects the Canadian approach. 
Thus, where s 623(h)(4) of the New York Business Corporation Law 
directed that fair value must be interpreted in the light of the "nature of the 
transaction" triggering the buy-out rights and "its effect on the corporation" 
and "all other relevant factors," the New York Court ofAppeals in Cawley 
v SCM Corporation held that "post merger factors enter valuation 
 computation^."^^^ The Court of Appeals ultimately included in its 
assessment of company value non-speculative tax benefits that accrued to 
the newly amalgamated company in a triangular merger where minority 
shareholders were squeezed out. 
The Sunreme Court of Delaware came to a similar conclusion in the 
case of the squeeze-out merger in Weinberger: 
It is significant that section 262 now mandates determination of "fair value" based upon 
"all relevant factors." Only the speculative elements of value that might arise from the 
"accomplishment or expectation' of the merger are cxcluded. We take this to be a very 
narrow exception to the appraisal process, designed to eliminate use ofpro,forma data and 
projections of speculative variety relating to the completion of a merger. But elements of 
future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of 
proof as of the date of merger and not the product of speculation may be considered.lS2 
The New Zealand courts have experience in choosing the appropriate 
date to reflect the "fair value" of shares in the context of the prejudiced 
shareholders remedy'53 and the lack of statutory detail on this point will 
allow such an approach to continue in cases of valuations involving 
dissenting shareholders' shares. 
Allocation of company value to the shares of dissenting shareholders 
When it comes to allocating the value of the company to individual 
shareholdings the issue is whether the allocation should be done on a pro- 
rata basis or whether the particular attributes of the shares and size of the 
holding ought to be taken into account. If a "willing but not anxious" 
buyer and seller test is followed then clearly the latter approach will 
p r e ~ a i 1 . I ~ ~  n such an instance it is common practice for a discount to be 
149 Brunt Inve.stment.s Ltd v KeepRite Inc (1 991) 80 DLR (4th) 16 1, 198. See also New Quebec Raglan 
M1ne.r Ltd v Blok-Andersen (1 993) 9 BLR (2d) 93. 
150 Brunt Inve.stments Ltd v ~ e i p ~ i t e ~ n c  (1991) 80 DLR (4th) 161, 198. 
151 530 N.E2d 1264, 1267 (1988). 
152 140A.2d 701,713 (1983). 
153 See Struthers v Opprnheimer NZ Ltd [I9941 MCLR 156, 183,;Holden v Architectural Finishes 
Ltd (1996) 7 NZCLC 260.976.261.007. affirmed (unreported) Blanchard, Barker, Doogue JJ, 17 
April 1997, CA, CA272195 
154 Hatrrck v Commzc~zoneroflnlandRevenue [I9631 NZLR 64 I (CA), Holt v Holt (1 990) 5 NZCLC 
66.620 (PC), Multrplv Ltd v Old Mrll Farm Ltd (1 995) 7 NZCLC 260,746 
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applied to a minority holding to reflect the fact that a willing buyer and 
willing seller would view a majority holding as having greater value than 
a minority holding. 
In squeeze-out transactions the general rule in the United States is that 
minority discounts are inapplicable: 
The dissenting shareholder's proportionate interest is determined only after the company 
as an entity has been valued. In that the Court of Chancery is not required to apply further 
weighting factors at the shareholder level, such as discounts to minority shares for asserted 
lack of marketability . . . The application of a discount to a minority shareholder is contrary 
to the requirement that the company be viewed as a "going concern." . . . More important, 
to fail to accord a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a 
penalty for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap 
a windfall from the appraisal process, by cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly 
undesirable result. 
If, however, the dissenting shareholders are electing to leave the 
company then the case for such a rule weakens. Indeed the American Law 
Institute has recommended that the rule against the imposition of minority 
discounts is one that applies in the absence of extraordinary 
 circumstance^.^^^ 
The Canadian courts have taken a wider approach and have held that 
the imposition of a minority discount is inappropriate whatever the kind 
of triggering transaction. Thus, in Domglas Inc v Jarislowsky, Fraser & 
Co Ltd, the Quebec Court of Appeal specifically approved the statement 
of the lower court that, in the context ofbuy-out rights, it would "be inimical 
to the concept of fair value" to impose a minority d i ~ c 0 u n t . l ~ ~  This approach 
has been the subject of academic criticism insofar as it allows a dissenting 
shareholder to receive more via the use of buy-out rights in the case of a 
"non-oppressive corporate action than he or she would have received if 
the shares had been sold on the open market.'58 However, earlier Canadian 
decisions went even further and allowed a forcing out premium in the case 
of squeeze out tran~acti0ns. l~~ Later cases have moved away from such an 
approach on the grounds that there is no basis for it in statute and that 
dissenting shareholders are sufficiently benefited by a pro-rata allocation 
of company value.'60 
Again, in the context of the prejudiced shareholders remedy, New 
Zealand case law has developed a similar approach. A minority discount 
has been held to be inappropriate"jl where one shareholder has been 
effectively forced from a closely held company that falls within Lord 
Wilberforce's definition of a "quasi-partner~hip.""~ This rule is not 
absolute. The view of Nourse J in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd163 that a 
minority discount may be appropriate in the case of a minority shareholder 
55 Cavalier 011 Corporation v Harnett 564A.2d 11 37, 1141 (1989) (Del. SC). See also In re McLoo~t 
Oil Co 565 A.2d 997, 1004-1005 (Me SC): R ~ g e l  Corp v Cutchell511 N.W.2d 519 (1994) (Neb 
SC). 
156 ~ m e r i c a n  Law Institute, op cit, above n 26, at 325. 
157 11982) 138 DLR (3d) 521. 525. See also Lo Cicero v BACMlndustries Ltd 119861 3 WWR 153. 
164  an CA); ~ ; * a i t  1nvestment.v Ltd v ~ e e j ~ i t e  Inc (1991) 138 DLR (4~h)~161, i94. (Ont CA): 
158 Krishna, op cit, above n 137, at 170. 
159 Domgias h e  v Jarislow~k., Fraser & Co (1982) 138 DLR (3d) 521 (Que CA): Investissements 
Mont-Soleil Inc v National Drug Ltd (1982) 22 BLR 139 (Que CA). 
160 Brunt Investments Ltd v Kee~Ri te  Inc (19911 138 DLR (4th) 161 (Ont CA); Re LoCicero and 
BACMlndus t r~e~  (1989) 49 DLR (4th) 159 (SCC), New Quebec Raglan v Blok-Andersen (1993) 
9 BLR 2d 93 
161 Struthers v Oppenlzezmer NZ Lid [I9941 MCLR 156, 182 
162 Ebrahzmz v Wevthourrze Galleuley Lid [I9721 2 All ER 492, 500 (HL). 
163 [1984] 3 All ER 444,450 affirmed [I9851 3 All ER 523 (CA) 
562 Canterbury Law Review [Vol6, 19971 
who paid a market price for his or shares, which included a discount, has 
been approved in New Zealand.164 
It is sensible that the issue of whether or not a minority discount is 
applied when fixing a price for a dissenting shareholder's shares is 
dependent on what is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances 
before the arbitrator. As a general rule is seems just that a minority discount 
should not apply when a shareholder is being squeezed out of a company. 
Further, in a situation where actual fundamental change has occurred it is 
possible to mount an argument that dissenting shareholders are not willing 
sellers in the sense that if the change had not occurred then they would not 
be looking to leave the company. If one takes a step back to consider why 
a minority shareholder may elect to leave a company undergoing 
fundamental change then it is likely to be because he or she perceives the 
change to be detrimental in some way. It may be that the change alters the 
financial risk, monetary value or time at which a return is expected from 
an investment. In other situations the risk or value of the investment might 
be unchanged but for ethical or other personal reasons a dissenting 
shareholder might not wish to continue to be associated with the company. 
On the other hand, where a shareholder exercises buy-out rights in 
circumstances where no fundamental change has occurred then there is no 
good reason why such shareholders should receive any more than what a 
willing but not anxious buyer would be prepared to pay for their shares. 
The stated basis for the introduction ofbuy-out rights in the Companies 
Act 1993 was to provide minority shareholders with an exit from a company 
at a fair and reasonable price in instances of fundamental change to the 
nature of the enterprise or of change to the rights attached to the shares of 
the interest group to which they belong. This explanation reflects the 
reasoning behind the introduction of buy-out rights into Canadian company 
law and their retention in the United States of America but does not 
accurately reflect the dual role such rights have played in North America. 
It is apparent that in New Zealand buy-out rights may be exercised in a 
long form amalgamation where the dissenting minority are being squeezed 
out of a company. However, the lack of statutory guidance in the Companies 
Act 1993 as to how a "fair and reasonable" price for shares is to be 
calculated leaves it open for the circumstances in which dissenting 
shareholders exercise buy-out rights to be taken into account in New 
Zealand in an assessment of share price. 
The buy-out rights in the Companies Act 1993 are narrower than those 
in Canada in one important regard and that is that they are only available 
to shareholders who have the right to vote and who do vote against the 
special resolutions that trigger such rights. This is a distinction for which 
there seems to be no justification. However, when the focus turns to the 
way in which the triggering special resolutions are defined it is apparent 
that the New Zealand definitions are much broader than those commonly 
found in North America. Any concern that this might tip the balance too 
far in favour of the minority is countered by the ability of the company to 
apply to the High Court for an exemption from the obligation to purchase 
164 Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd (1996) 7 NZCLC 269,976,261,008, affirmed (unreported) 
Blanchard, Barker, Doogue JJ, 17 April 1997, CA, CA272195. 
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the shares of the minority. Whilst this cure increases the possibility that 
dissenting shareholders may be embroiled in litigation it must be 
emphasised that, unlike in North America, dissenting shareholders in New 
Zealand will not generally have the burden of establishing that buy-out 
rights have been triggered. 
The fact that buy-out rights are triggered without dissenting shareholders 
having to establish specified criteria for relief through litigation is the main 
ground of distinction between buy-out rights and other actions available 
to dissenting shareholders. However, as noted in the previous paragraph, 
this is not to say that the utilisation of buy-out rights will avoid litigation 
altogether. Further, by not requiring a company to disclose the basis on 
which it has calculated share price the current New Zealand statutory 
procedure encourages the likelihood that a dissenting shareholder will be 
involved in arbitration to test the share price offered by the company. If 
this is the case then any saving in time, cost and stress which might 
otherwise be associated with buy-out rights would be lost. This of course 
assumes, in the first place, that dissenting shareholders are sufficiently 
well informed about the availability of buy-out rights to take advantage of 
them. As there is no obligation on the company to inform dissenting 
shareholders of the availability of buy-out rights, except in the case of a 
special resolution approving a long form amalgamation, this cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Thus, overall, it must be said that buy-out rights in the Companies Act 
1993 receive a mixed report which may go some way to explaining why 
some three and a half years after the coming into force of the Companies 
Act 1993 165 such rights have attracted little comment and have generated 
no case law. Rather than suggesting that all is working well it seems that a 
more appropriate explanation is that buy-out rights have, as yet, had little 
impact in New Zealand. 
165 The Companies Act 1993 came into force on 1 July 1994: Companies Act 1993, s l(2). 
